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The impact of cash holdings and financial leverage on stock performance  
in boom and crisis periods 
Shaobo Shen 
This paper explores the effects of cash holdings and financial leverage on firms’ stock performance 
in contrasting economic periods: booms and crises. We use US listed firms with S&P investment 
grade ratings as our sample and select four different periods to represent economic expansion and 
distress. Using an expanded Fama-French model, we conclude that cash holdings and financial 
leverage exhibit opposite influences during different periods. Rich cash holdings can significantly 
protect firm stock performance during recession periods, but conversely can damage stock 
performance during economic growth periods. Moreover, aggressive financial leverage strategies 
are positively associated with stock performance during expansion periods and negatively 
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On September 15, 2008, the stock price of Lehman Brothers fell to $0.21 and on the 
following day, the fourth largest investment bank in the United States filed bankruptcy. After 
operating for over 150 years and described as too big to fail, Lehman Brothers became history. 
However, when it filed bankruptcy, it had $639 billion in assets and $619 billion in debt1. Mawutor 
(2014) explains that the reason for Lehman Brothers’ failure was not that its assets could not cover 
its liabilities, but that the firm lacked sufficient liquidity. In the first quarter of 2007, housing prices 
in the United States began to fall and a large number of defaults began to occur. As a result, as one 
of the largest mortgage-holding investment banks, Lehman Brothers could not collect the usual 
amount of cash flow from its mortgage business. Therefore, Lehman Brothers had to use another 
approach to find enough liquidity to cover its interest expense. However, because of its extremely 
high leverage ratio (Assets/Equity) of 242, Lehman Brothers was not able obtain much current 
financing from commercial banks. Even worse, the continuous decline in housing prices caused 
the value of its mortgage assets to depreciate, making it hard to find buyers. Eventually, by 
September 12, 2008, Lehman had only $1.1 billion in cash3. Due to its lack of solvency, the 
company’s investors started to panic and Lehman’s stock price fell sharply. Finally, the firm 
became bankrupt. 
As the famous economist Ben Shalom Bernanke said, confidence is something fragile and 
when a crisis occurs, only enough liquidity can appease investors and avoid a run. The most direct 
reason for Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy is obviously its lack of liquidity. Moreover, it is not 
                                                          
1 Koppenheffer, M. (2019). 7 Mind-Blowing Numbers from the Lehman Brothers Disaster | the Motley 
Fool. 
2 Same as above 
3 Same as above 
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difficult to see that in Lehman Brothers’ case, high leverage was another important reason for its 
failure; this aggravated the initial lack of liquidity and prevented the investment bank from 
attracting new investors and later recovering. 
In fact, the results of this situation are not a coincidence. On the contrary, as early as the 
1930s, the prominent economist Irving Fisher had already proposed the well-known theory of debt 
deflation. Fisher (1933) indicated that during economic booms, the credit system would rapidly 
expand because of overinvestment and eventually lead to a situation of overindebtedness. At that 
point, if the economic system was hit by an unexpected shock, the value of entire market’s 
mortgage function would be greatly reduced due to asset depreciation. In this case, debtors might 
have difficulty repaying debt, because they would be unable to find other financing to acquire the 
necessary liquidity. Meanwhile, if there was no external intervention, debtors would end up with 
a compulsory debt settlement. As noted by Ivashina and Scharfestein (2009), in the 2008 financial 
crisis, new loans fell by 79% compared to the boom period.  
Therefore, lack of liquidity and overindebtedness are considered two central reasons for 
the decline in firm performance during a crisis. However, by contrast, during an expansion period, 
poor liquidity and high leverage can greatly benefit a firm. According to Sraders (2019)4, Lehman 
Brothers earned a huge amount of profits before the crisis due to its extremely high leverage and 
poor liquidity strategy. Between 2004 and 2006, Lehman Brothers recorded the fastest growth rate 
among investment banks and other asset management institutions. At the end of 2006, Lehman 
Brothers held an $85 billion portfolio of mortgage-backed securities5, which was four times the 
amount of its shareholders’ equity, and held only a few cash assets in its current account. As a 
                                                          
4 Sraders, A. (2019). The Lehman Brothers Collapse and How It's Changed the Economy Today.  
5 Crossley-Holland, D. (2019). Lehman Brothers, the bank that bust the boom. 
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result, in 2006, the firm earned net income of $4.2 billion with only $19.3 billion in equity6. 
Clearly, these two strategies result in different patterns in different periods. Therefore, this study 
explores the effects of cash holdings and financial leverage on firm performance during periods of 
booms and crises. Since cash and cash equivalents are the most liquid assets, in this study, we use 
cash holdings to represent liquidity.  
The reminder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes prior studies and 
proposes the hypotheses. Section 3 illustrates the methodology. Section 4 describes the variables 
and data, and Section 5 explains the empirical results. Section 6 concludes with the study’s findings 
and limitations. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Cash holdings 
The effects of cash holdings on firm performance have been debated for decades. On the 
one hand, firm performance can be negatively affected by large cash holdings because of 
managers’ tendency to overinvest. Myers and Rajan (1998) claim that when firms have too much 
cash, managers may invest in poor quality projects, such as those with negative NPV, and damage 
firm performance. In addition, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) argue that large cash holdings can also 
lead to entrenched managers stealing. Large cash holdings can reduce the pressure on managers to 
perform well and lead them to choose projects that best meet their own objectives, but may not be 
in shareholders’ best interests. On the other hand, large cash holdings can also positively influence 
firm performance. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that large cash holdings can reduce the chance 
of underinvestment, a situation where managers do not undertake good projects (those with 
                                                          
6 Sraders, A. (2019). The Lehman Brothers Collapse and How It's Changed the Economy Today. 
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positive NPV) because of inadequate cash. Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2012) mention 
that large cash holdings can reduce a firm’s short-tern default risk, while Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
note that cash can lower firms’ cost of capital. 
Several studies find that larger cash holdings can negatively influence firm performance. 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) examine the cash balances data for EMU countries from 1987 to 2000, 
where they find a negative relationship between cash holdings and firm performance. In addition, 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) collect cross-sectional data of 5,102 firms from 31 different countries 
in 1996; they find that when external country-level shareholder protection is weak, cash holdings 
are negatively related to firm performance. Moreover, Jose, Lancaster, and Stevens (1996) study 
2,718 full-recorded US listed firms from 1974 to 1993 and conclude that aggressive working 
capital policies, which refers to low cash holdings, can benefit firm performance. 
To summarize, we observe that in the papers mentioned above, the samples all cover an 
economic expansion period. The only exception is Jose, Lancaster, and Stevens (1996), whose 
sample includes several recession periods; however, since these periods only account for about 
20% of their total sample, we believe the effects may be effectively diluted, and the results should 
be considered as relating to an economic expansion period. 
In contrast, there are also numerous studies that find a positive relationship between cash 
holdings and firm performance. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) study the performance of 89 US 
listed firms that hold over 25% of their assets in cash or cash equivalents between 1986 and 1991 
and between 1992 and 1996, and they observe a positive relationship between cash holdings and 
firm performance. Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garrigacd (2013) analyze the effects of cash 
holdings on firm performance during the 2008 financial crisis. They collect data for 2,250 US 
listed non-financial firms from July 2007 to June 2008 and conclude that large cash holdings can 
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benefit firm performance during a financial crisis. Using four-digit industry codes, Fresard (2010) 
analyzes 105 industries from 1973 to 2006 and find a positive relationship between cash holdings 
and firm performance. 
After reviewing the papers mentioned above, we find their conclusions of a positive 
relationship between cash holdings and firm performance are largely induced by their biased 
sample selection. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) and Fresard (2010) use limited samples of firms 
that meet certain conditions, while Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garrigacd (2013) study the 
relationship only during a crisis period. 
Connecting the above studies, we believe period selection is the exclusive reason for their 
different conclusions about the relationship between cash holdings and firm performance, where 
large cash holdings have a negative relationship with firm performance during economic 
expansion periods and a positive relationship during economic recessions. Therefore, we propose 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Cash holdings are positively associated with stock performance during a crisis. 
Hypothesis 2: Cash holdings are negatively associated with stock performance during a boom. 
2.2 Financial leverage 
The effects of financial leverage on firm performance have also been a concern for decades. 
First, high financial leverage is known to be positively associated with firm performance because 
of better external supervision. As Ilyukhin (2015) describes, commercial banks establish a series 
of financial conditions for firms that borrow from them, and to meet these conditions, managers 
must work hard and improve firm performance. In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose 
that high financial leverage leads to low agency costs for all capital sources, and further, increase 
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firm performance. Finally, but importantly, Jensen (1987) indicates that higher financial leverage 
means higher interest expense and lower free cash flow, which potentially reduces the agency costs 
of free cash flow and increases firm performance. However, in contrast, high financial leverage 
may also negatively influence firm performance as a result of default risk, as Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973) illustrate. They claim that financial leverage leads to firm insolvency and 
triggers bankruptcy costs, which potentially reduce firm performance. Moreover, Bradley and Kim 
(1984) suggest that higher financial leverage results in heavier “leverage-related” costs, including 
bankruptcy penalties and the agency costs of liabilities, and waste non-debt tax shields, which 
damages corporate profits. As we can observe from prior studies, they are more focus on the 
accounting performance and propose the mechanical possibility of the different effects of financial 
leverage. Although we are not look into mechanical effects, since the stock performance perceive 
the account performance, we believe the effects are also existing for stock performance. 
To prove their theories on the influence of financial leverage on firm performance, many 
scholars propose their own studies. On the one hand, a group of economists support the conclusion 
that financial leverage can be positively associated with firm performance. Margaritis and Psillaki 
(2010) explore French firms in the chemical, computer, and textile industries from 2002 to 2005 
and use the debt-to-assets ratio to define financial leverage. Eventually, they conclude that high 
financial leverage has a positive influence on firm performance. Berger and Di Patti (2006) study 
US commercial banks from 1984 to 1995 and use the equity-to-assets ratio to represent financial 
leverage. Their results show that high financial leverage can effectively decrease agency costs and 
improve firm performance. Margaritis and Psillaki (2007) analyze the relationship between 
financial leverage and firm performance using a sample of 12,240 New Zealand firms from 2003 
to 2004, and measure financial leverage using the long-term debt ratio. They conclude that high 
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levels of financial leverage can positively influence firm performance. Regarding the papers 
above, we observe that they either use periods of economic expansion (Margaritis and Psillaki, 
2010; Margaritis and Psillaki, 2007), or apply a long period (Berger and Di Patti (2006)), where 
the effects of extreme periods are fully diluted.  
On the other hand, a number of scholars insist there is a negative relationship between 
financial leverage and firm performance. González (2013) examines the relationship between 
financial leverage and firm performance using a sample of 10,375 firms from 39 countries during 
industrial downturns and measure financial leverage with total debt (short-term and long-term) 
divided by total assets. Consequently, they find that financial leverage is negatively associated 
with firm performance during periods of distress. Opler and Titman (1994) use 46,799 firm-year 
observations for US listed firms from 1972 to 1991 and include in their model an interaction 
dummy variable for financial leverage and distress industry to analyze the effects of financial 
leverage on firm performance during industrial distress periods. They measure financial leverage 
using the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets and conclude that high 
financial leverage reduces firm performance during distress periods. Tsuruta (2016) conducts 
research on small Japanese firms from 2003 to 2009, an economic recession period7. He measures 
financial leverage by the ratio of the total book value of debt to the book value of total assets, and 
finds financial leverage has a negative effect on firm performance. 
Summarizing the papers above, we can see that the findings of a negative relationship 
between financial leverage and firm performance all result from testing during a distress period. 
Therefore, we believe the effect of financial leverage on firm performance has different patterns 
                                                          




during different periods. More precisely, we believe high financial leverage can improve firm 
performance during boom periods and worsen firm performance during crisis periods. 
Furthermore, to clarify our arguments, we establish the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3: Financial leverage is negatively associated with stock performance during crises. 
Hypothesis 4: Financial leverage is positively associated with stock performance during booms. 
3. Methodology  
To test our hypotheses, we employ an extension of the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor (FF3) model to explain the connection between stock performance and fundamental 
information. During the past decades, many scholars have refined the FF3 model with the goal of 
obtaining better explanatory power. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) indicate that a recent 
performance, momentum, or WML (winners minus losers) variable can be added to the FF3 model 
to obtain better explanatory power. Carhart (1997) adds an extra momentum factor to the FF3 
model and obtains better results. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) imply that the FF3 model 
incompletely explains the variation, and suggest improving it by adding profitability and 
investment variables. Petkova (2006) illustrates that a model including investment variables 
performs better than the FF3 model. Charghori, Chanm, and Faff (2007) test the FF3 model using 
a sample that covers January 1995 to December 2004 and conclude that the model cannot proxy 
for default risk. Berk, DeMarzo, and Harford (2009) employ a fourth WML factor and find it better 
explains excess returns than the FF3 model. Gregory and Tharyan (2013) test a four-factor model 
with an extra factor that is decomposed and value‐weighted, and show that it works better than the 
FF3 model when there is no exposure to extreme momentum. Even Fama and French (2015) add 
profitability and investment variables to their original three-factor model and illustrate its better 
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ability to explain excess returns. To summarize, the extended FF3 model has been applied to 
measure the influence of momentum factors on firm stock performance. Moreover, as Fama French 
(2015) describe, Fama French model shall be more effective for the normal period and the 
effectiveness during the extreme period needs to be study further. Therefore, this study extends 
the FF3 model with two more factors to enhance the power of Fama French model during the 
extreme period and uses the extended model to test our hypotheses. 
3.1 Portfolio building 
Following Fama and French (1993), we first form 25 portfolios by size and cash holdings 
and calculate the monthly excess returns for each portfolio to test the effect of cash holdings on 
firm performance. Then, we repeat the procedure and form portfolios by size and financial leverage 
to observe the effects of financial leverage.  
Since circumstances during a financial crisis change quickly, to avoid missing useful 
information, we rebalance our portfolios both annually8 and quarterly9. In line with Fama and 
French’s (1993) original methodology, we sort the stocks in the annually rebalanced portfolios 
once a year at the end of June. We first calculate the quintile breakpoints for size and cash holdings 
(financial leverage), respectively, by equally sorting at the end of June of year t, and then we 
calculate intersecting breakpoints for the corresponding variables. Finally, we allocate valid stocks 
from the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stock markets into the portfolio framework. The procedure 
used to form quarterly rebalanced portfolios is primarily the same; the main difference is that we 
                                                          
8 The annually rebalanced methodology means we calculate the variables (market value of equity, book 
value of equity, cash asset ratio, and financial leverage) once per year to allocate the companies, and then 
calculate the value-weighted returns for the portfolios. 
9 The quarterly rebalanced methodology means we calculate the variables (market value of equity, book 
value of equity, cash asset ratio and financial leverage) once per quarter to allocate the companies, and then 
calculate the value weighted returns for the portfolios. 
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calculate size, cash holdings, and financial leverage and allocate stocks by quarter. We conduct 
the processes above for each sample period we select (both recession and boom), to compare the 
effects of cash holdings and financial leverage in different periods.  
The other detailed procedures and proxies are identical to those of Fama and French (1993). 
In the annually rebalanced portfolios, we measure firm size using the market value of equity, the 
book to market value ratio, cash holdings, and financial leverage at the end of December of year 
t-1. We exclude firms until they have been included in Compustat for two years. We use the 
NASDAQ breakpoints for ME, BE/ME10, CH, and LEV to allocate the NYSE, Amex, and 
NASDAQ stocks. In the quarterly rebalanced portfolios, we re-measure all variables and re-
allocate stocks every quarter. 
Finally, to improve the rigor of our analysis, we also conduct a univariate test for excess 
monthly returns. However, since it is hard to test the value-weighted geometric mean directly, we 
transform the returns into natural logarithms and test the difference in the value-weighted 
arithmetic average return for the transformed data to test the null hypothesis. 
3.2 Regression test 
To test the effects of the two proposed variables in a multivariate setting, we estimate a 
regression analysis. First, we test the proposed effects separately. In terms of cash holdings and 
financial leverage, the first tested model is shown in equation (1): 
                                                          
10 The book value of equity is equal to the recorded amount of total stockholders' equity plus deferred taxes 
and investment tax credits minus preferred stock; the market value of equity is equal to shares outstanding 
times the closing price of the corresponding stock. Preferred stock is estimated by redemption, liquidation, 




𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                 (1) 
 In equation (1), consistent with Fama and French’s (1993) description, Rit is the return on 
security or portfolio i for sample period t. RFt stands for the risk free return for the same period t, 
and RMt is the return on the value-weighted market portfolio. SMBt represents the difference 
between the returns on a diversified portfolio of small stocks and the returns on a diversified 
portfolio of large stocks. HMLt indicates the difference between the returns on diversified 
portfolios with high B/M values during period t minus the return on diversified portfolios with low 
B/M values. All three variables above are from Fama French three-factor model and after that, 
RMPt is a brand new variable we create and it refers to the excess returns of stocks with rich cash 
holdings minus the excess returns of stocks with poor cash holdings. Finally, eit is a zero-mean 
residual11. In addition, regarding the parameters in equation (1) as true figures instead of estimates, 
if the factor exposures bi, si, hi, and ri explain all the variation in expected returns, the intercept ai 
should be zero for all securities and portfolios i. 
After that, we check financial leverage, our second variable; the model is shown in equation 
(2): 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                 (2) 
where CMAt indicates the excess returns of firms with conservative financial leverage minus the 
excess returns of firms with aggressive financial leverage during time period t. 
In equation (3), we test the effects of cash holdings and financial leverage jointly, as 
follows: 
                                                          
11 We apply 2*2*2*2 strategy when calculating SMB, HML, RMP, CMA factors. 
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡             (3) 
However, compared to Fama and French (1993, 2015), which use monthly data over more 
than 40 years to perform the regression, our separate sample financial crisis periods are much 
shorter. Therefore, to increase our model’s empirical power, we use daily data under a quarterly 
rebalancing principal. In addition, we conduct a VIF (variance inflation factor) test for all 
regression results to check for multicollinearity problems. 
In our final model, considering the special dimension of separating the sample periods, we 
add two extra interaction dummy variables to our model, shown in equation (4) below: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +
𝑚𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                          (4) 
where RMPC and CMAC are two interact dummy variables. We build a variable “CrisisD” as a 
dummy variable that refers to a crisis period, and equals 1 for observations during a financial crisis, 
and 0 for observations during a boom. RMPC is equal to RMP*CrisisD, which is an interaction 
dummy variable that equals RMP for crisis periods and 0 for boom periods. CMAC is equal to 
CMA*CrisisD, which is an interaction dummy variable that equals CMA for crisis periods and 0 
for boom periods. 
4. Variable and Data Descriptions 
4.1 Variable measurement 
4.1.1 Measurement of cash holdings 
The measurements used in the literature for cash holdings vary. Gregory (2005); Han and 
Qiu (2007); Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009); Álvarez, Sagner, and Valdivia (2012); Harford, Klasa, 
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and Maxwell (2013); Deb, David, and O’Brien (2015); and Rocca and Cambrea (2018) use the 
cash to assets ratio, which equals cash and marketable securities divided by the book value of 
assets, to represent cash holdings in their studies. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) 
and Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) apply cash and short term investments divided by 
the book value of total assets excluding cash and short-term investments to denote cash holdings. 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) employ cash and cash equivalents divided by the market value 
of equity to measure cash holdings. Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) measure cash holdings 
using the ratio of cash to sales. 
Following Gregory (2005), Han and Qiu (2007), and others, we measure cash holdings 
using cash and short-term investments (Compustat item #1) divided by the book value of total 
assets (Compustat item #6), as shown in equation (5) below: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 =  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝐶𝐻𝐸)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝐴𝑇)
                                                  (5) 
Considering the cash holdings mentioned in our case are mainly used to cover interest 
expense, in this paper, we apply an interest coverage ratio12 (cash and short-term investments 
“CHE” over interest expense “XINTQ”) to represent the cash ratio as a robustness check to make 
our study more representative.13 
                                                          
12 Other well-accepted liquidity measurements include: the cash ratio (1st grade liquidity) = liquid funds 
over short-term liabilities, the quick ratio (2nd grade liquidity) = (liquid funds + short-term receivables + 
securities) over short-term liabilities, and the current ratio (3rd grade liquidity) = (liquid funds + short-term 
receivables + securities +inventories) over short-term and mid-term liabilities. These measurements are 
closely related to the measure we use in our robustness check. We do not expect the results to differ 
significantly because that group of measures also accounts for the firm’s ability to pay their liabilities out 
of funds that can be liquidated on short notice. 
13 We add this measure not only to use the most popular liquidity measure but also to use one that accounts 
for the firm’s ability to pay its interest expense. 
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4.1.2 Measurement of financial leverage 
Measurements of financial leverage are also well discussed in the extant literature. Ghosh 
and Jain (2000); González (2013); Tsuruta (2016); Bae, Kim, and Oh (2017); and Davies, Hillier, 
and McColgan (2005) measure financial leverage as the ratio of total debt over the book value of 
total assets. Maury and Pajuste (2005) denote financial leverage with long-term debt over total 
assets. Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu (2005) use both total debt over total assets and long-term debt over 
total assets to represent financial leverage. 
To be consistent with prior studies, we use long-term debt (Compustat item #9) plus debt 
included in current liabilities (Compustat item #34) over the book value of total assets (Compustat 
item #6) to measure financial leverage, following González (2013), Bae, Kim, and Oh (2017), and 
others. Equation (7) presents the calculation: 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 (𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇) + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠(𝐷𝐿𝐶)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝐴𝑇)
   (7) 
As above, we perform a robustness check using long-term debt (DLTT) over total assets 
(AT). We believe the long-term debt ratio is an excellent measurement of financial leverage due 
to its stable nature over time, and the fact that it is not easily diluted by short-term borrowings.14 
4.2 Data and sample definition 
Market efficiency is a considerable factor in market selection, because stock performance 
can reflect firms’ operating information better in a more efficient market. Therefore, we use the 
US market as our sample. Our sample consists of US listed firms included in Compustat’s annual 
                                                          




and quarterly data with available balance sheet and income statement data.15 We exclude firms 
without positive cash holdings or positive financial leverage. According to Altman (1989), firms 
with higher credit ratings are less likely to default than others. Thus, when analyzing financial 
leverage, we use firms with S&P investment grade ratings (BBB- and higher) as our sample to 
offset the potential problem of our sample being biased by possible firm defaults.16 
The sample period includes both crisis (recession) periods and booms. According to 
NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee, we select July 1990 to March 1991 (9 months and 
188 working days) and from December 2007 to June 2009 (19 months and 397 working days) to 
represent financial crises17. We do not include the recession of 2001 because that crisis was mainly 
focused on the IT industry18. Correspondingly, we select October 2006 to June 2007 (9 months 
and 187 working days) and September 2014 to March 2016 (19 months and 398 working days) to 
denote economic expansion periods. 
To summarize, our baseline sample consists of US listed firms with an S&P Domestic Long 
Term Issuer Credit Rating of BBB- or higher for the four separate periods identified above, 
including 560 (July 1990-March 1991), 700 (December 2007-June 2009), 690 (October 2006-June 
2007), and 688 (September 2014-March 2016) firms. We obtain the accounting data, including 
book value of equity, cash and short-term investments, long-term debt, debt in current liabilities, 
                                                          
15 Note that we do not exclude banks and the other financial firms as other corporate finance papers would 
do. There are two main reasons: the first one is that our paper largely follows Fama French (1993) and 
Fama French (2015) and since they do not exclude them, we do not do that as well; a second reason is that 
we have tried the eliminated sample and the results are remain unchanged. 
16 Note that we do not apply the S&P rating selection for the cash holdings analysis procedure because there 
is no clear evidence showing a critical relationship between cash holdings and survival bias, and we believe 
the full sample will result in better explanatory power. Moreover, we also check the effects of cash holdings 
by selected samples and the results remain unchanged. 
17 Retrieved 4 December 2019, from https://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html. (2019). 
18 Amadeo, K. (2019). How 9/11 Worsened the 2001 Recession. Retrieved 4 December 2019. 
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and total assets from Compustat North America annually and quarterly. We collect the S&P 
Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit Rating from Compustat Ratings. In addition, we acquire the 
monthly and daily stock returns, shares outstanding, and closing stock prices (to calculate the 
market value of equity), from CRSP monthly and daily data. Finally, we get the monthly and daily 
risk-free rate from WRDS Fama French & Liquidity Factors monthly and daily. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Portfolios sorted by size and cash holdings 
We begin our presentation of results with the full sample. Tables 1a and 1b exhibit value-
weighted average monthly excess returns for 25 size-cash holdings portfolios. We denote firms 
within least 20% cash holdings as “poor,” and firms within the top 20% of cash holdings as “rich.” 
*******************************Insert table 1a here******************************* 
*******************************Insert table 1b here******************************* 
Panel R1, our first economic recession period, in Tables 1a and 1b shows that excess 
monthly returns typically increase from cash poor stocks to rich stocks, independent of firm size. 
Portfolios for firms with high market value and poor cash are an exception. After checking firms 
in this portfolio, we find that firms with the largest influence (market value of equity) are mainly 
energy firms and telecommunications companies. Therefore, we regard the industrial nature of 
firms as a possible explanation (Gardner, 1994).19 The effect of cash holdings in R2 of Tables 1a 
and 1b, which refers to our second economic recession period, is not clear20. Generally, smaller 
                                                          
19 The immediate cause of the 1990 crisis was the oil price shock and “the bulk of these losses were in 
construction and manufacturing” as Gardner (1994) describes. 
20 In a robustness check, we only include investment grade firms. However, the results remain largely 
similar to those shown in Tables 1a and 1b for Panel R2. 
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firms show lower excess returns compared to larger firms, independent of cash holdings. Possible 
explanations include the uniqueness of the 2008 credit crisis, during which external financing 
options were largely constrained, and when there is a loss of confidence, firms tend to cancel or 
postpone operations and investments. As Campello and Harvey (2010) note, this dilutes the effects 
of cash holdings. 
In line with our expectations, in Panels E1 and E2 of Tables 1a and 1b, which refer to the 
economic expansion periods, the monthly excess returns for the first four rows roughly fall from 
stocks with poor cash holdings to stocks with rich cash holdings. Similar to R1, we find that 
portfolios with high market value in Panel E2 of Tables 1a and 1b have a different pattern, where 
the negative effect is largely reversed. 
To obtain more indirect information, we conduct a univariate test for excess returns of 
portfolios with rich cash holdings and those with poor cash holdings; these results are presented in 
Table 2. 
*******************************Insert table 2 here******************************* 
Table 2 shows the univariate analysis results. Rows (3) and (6) of column R1 (recession 
period) show that the average monthly excess returns of stocks with poor cash holdings are 
significantly smaller than those with rich cash holdings in most cases, which supports hypothesis 
1 that stocks with rich cash holdings perform better during crisis periods. However, the excess 
returns difference for our second recession period (R2) is not significant in row (3) and is 
significantly positive in row (6), which is inconsistent with our expectations.  
On the contrary, for the economic expansion periods (Columns E1 and E2), we observe 
significantly positive results in row (3) of E1, which means firms with poor cash holdings 
18 
 
experience better stock performance during economic expansion periods, thus supporting 
hypothesis 2. Contrary to hypothesis 2, the figures in row (6) of E2 are negative and significant at 
the 5% level, while the other results are not statistically significant at the usual levels. It is possible 
these abnormal results are biased by the value-weighted calculation, because value-weighted 
excess returns are more affected by firms with high market value, which makes the results less 
representative. Additionally, because of the univariate nature of our analysis, our results may be 
diluted by other effects such the B/M ratio, which may affect the excess returns observed. Thus, 
we test our results in a multivariate setting to account for those effects. 
5.2 Portfolios by size and financial leverage 
For the following analysis, we only include investment grade firms because non-
investment grade firms exhibit high default risk, especially in times of recession, which would bias 
the analysis. The results for the complete sample are available upon request. Tables 3a and 3b 
show the value-weighted average monthly excess returns for 25 size-financial leverage portfolios. 
We denote firms in the lowest 20% of financial leverage as “conservative,” and identify firms in 
the highest 20% of financial leverage as “aggressive.” In addition, we collect the median S&P 
long-term domestic debt rating for each portfolio; the results are included in Appendices E1 and 
E2. 
*******************************Insert table 3a here******************************* 
*******************************Insert table 3b here******************************* 
From Panels R1 and R2 of Tables 3a and 3b, we observe that for the largest size quintile, 
extremely high leverage is associated with lower average excess returns than extremely low 
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leverage, which is consistent with hypothesis 321. However, the trend in the other size quintiles is 
not clear. One possible reason is the different ratings; while we require investment grade, due to 
sample size, we do not limit our results to firms with a specific rating. 
For smaller to mid-size firms in Panels R1 and R2 with annual balancing, in line with our 
expectations we find the 4th quintile (2nd most aggressive leverage) exhibits lower average excess 
returns compared to firms with less aggressive leverage, despite better ratings (see Appendix E1 
and Appendix E2). When quarterly rebalancing is applied, this effect vanishes and, contrary to our 
expectations, firms with high (more aggressive) leverage on average have higher average returns 
compared to firms with more conservative leverage, despite similar or better ratings. Similar to 
our univariate findings for cash, our results may be diluted by other effects such the B/M ratio, 
which may affect the excess returns observed. 
A relatively clear upward trend exists in the economic expansion periods. For all size 
quintiles in Panel E2 of Table 3a, portfolios with aggressive financial leverage experience higher 
excess returns than portfolios with conservative financial leverage, despite equal or lower ratings. 
There are some exceptions in Panel E1 of Tables 3a and 3b as well as Panel E2 of Table 3b, which 
can largely be explained by rating differences (see Appendix E1 and Appendix E2). We generally 
observe that the average return rises as leverage increases, which supports hypothesis 4: high 
financial leverage is positively associated with stock performance during economic expansion 
periods. 
                                                          




We also conduct a univariate test for excess returns of portfolios with aggressive leverage 
and with conservative leverage; these results are shown in Table 4. 
*******************************Insert table 4 here******************************** 
Table 4 presents the univariate evidence. Although some of the differences are not 
significant, we observe that for the recession periods (R1 and R2), firms with conservative 
financial leverage have better stock prices than firms that apply an aggressive financial leverage 
strategy, which supports hypothesis 3. Moreover, in the second expansion period, we observe 
better stock performance for firms with high financial leverage, which is consistent with 
hypothesis 4. However, the difference for the first economic expansion period (E1) is negative. 
One possible explanation could be differences in the ratings of firms in the different portfolios, 
causing deviations in the cost of capital or changes in credibility over time; we note that portfolios 
with a conservative leverage strategy share an overall higher rating than portfolios with an 
aggressive leverage policy, as discussed above. 
5.3 Regression test 
This section presents our multivariate evidence using an extension of the FF3 model. 
*******************************Insert table 5 here******************************* 
Table 5 shows the results from the four-factor model that includes the cash holdings 
variable, and the results are clear. In line with hypotheses 1 and 2, the PMR factor is significantly 
positive during the two recession periods and significantly negative during the expansion periods, 
illustrating that rich cash holdings can positively influence stock returns during economic 
recession periods and are negatively associated with firm performance during economic expansion 
periods. In addition, all the variance inflation factor (VIF) results are less than 3, which indicates 
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multicollinearity is not a significant problem in this study. A robustness check was conducted 
using the interest coverage ratio to represent the cash ratio; the results are the same, and are 
included in Appendix A. 
*******************************Insert table 6 here******************************* 
Table 6 presents the results for the four-factor model that includes financial leverage. We 
observe a significantly positive coefficient for the CMA factor in the first recession period, which 
supports hypothesis 3 that a low level of financial leverage can benefit stock returns during a 
recession. However, the result for the second recession period is insignificant, although it is still 
positive. With respect to Fosberg (2013), we think the unique nature of a short-term debt increase 
may drive the results, and we later perform a robustness check using the long-term debt/asset ratio. 
On the contrary, in line with hypothesis 4, the coefficients for the two economic expansion periods 
are both significantly negative, which means a high level of financial leverage can positively 
influence stock performance during boom periods. The largest variance inflation factor (VIF) in 
table 7 is only 2.89, which implies there is no issue with multicollinearity.  
We also conduct a robustness check using the long-term debt ratio to represent financial 
leverage; the results are included in Appendix B, where the CMA coefficients support hypotheses 
3 and 4. Considering the results in table 6 and Appendix B, we suggest a possible explanation for 
the insignificant coefficient of the CMA factor in R2 in Table 6 lies in the exclusive nature of the 
intense increase in short-term debt in the 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, the total debt/assets ratio 
would be somewhat less representative. 
*******************************Insert table 7 here******************************* 
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We combine the cash holdings and financial leverage factors in a single model, and the 
results of this five-factor model are shown in Table 7. The main results are largely unchanged. The 
coefficients for the RMP and CMA factors are all positive during the economic recession periods, 
although the CMA coefficient for period R2 is not statistically significant. This may be due to the 
unique nature of the 2008 crisis, as discussed above. Most of the coefficients are negative during 
the economic expansion periods, which is consistent with our hypotheses. However, the results of 
our sample period E2 are an exception, where more cash (we expected less) and more leverage 
result in better performance. However, the negative CMA coefficient is stronger than in the other 
expansion period, which could suggest very high leverage and thus very high interest expense. 
Thus, a possible explanation may be that firms should maintain higher cash levels to maintain a 
buffer as security and keep loan costs low. Again, with 3.32 as the largest VIF, there is no serious 
multicollinearity problem here either. As above, we conduct a robustness check and the results are 
included in Appendix C, where the RMP factors are all statistically significant at the usual levels 
and consistent with our hypothesis; however, CMA is not significant. Possible explanations 
include the rating migration issue and the uncommon nature of the 2008 crisis. 
5.4 Combined regression test interaction dummy variables 
In this section, we add two interaction dummy variables to our regression; the results are 
shown in Table 8. 
*****************************Insert table 8 about here***************************** 
Considering the results in Table 8, the coefficient of RMP represents the effect of cash 
holdings on firm performance during the economic expansion periods. It is significantly negative, 
which means rich cash holdings have a negative influence on firms’ stock performance during 
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boom periods, which supports hypothesis 2. Further, combining the coefficients for RMP and 
RMPC, we obtain a positive result, which indicates rich cash holdings can positively influence 
firm performance during a financial crisis, consistent with hypothesis 1. As we summarize above, 
holding more cash has two contradictory effects. It can either lead to an overinvestment problem 
and an entrenched manager stealing, which would negatively influence firm performance, or offset 
the underinvestment issue and decrease the default risk, which would potentially increase firm 
wealth. Our findings suggest that more (less) cash is better in a recession (boom), which implies 
more cash could lead to overinvestment and entrenched manager stealing problems during 
economic expansions and would largely offset the underinvestment problem and reduce default 
risk during recessions. 
Similarly, a negative coefficient of CMA in Table 8 indicates that a high level of financial 
leverage is negatively associated with firm performance during economic expansion periods. This 
supports hypothesis 4, but the combined figure for CMA and CMAC is close to zero. As a result, 
we cannot easily identify the overall effects; they may be due to a rating migration problem, which 
we will explore in the future. As we note in the literature review, a high level of financial leverage 
can both increase firm performance because of better external supervision and lower agency costs, 
and reduce firm profit, as a result of higher bankruptcy costs and higher agency costs. Our finding 
implies that during economic expansion periods, higher financial leverage can enhance external 
supervision and lead to overall lower agency costs, which benefits the firm, while during recession 
periods, a higher level of financial leverage means higher bankruptcy costs and even higher agency 
costs, which can be harmful to firm performance. 
The robustness check results are included in Appendix D, The coefficients of RMP, 
measured as cash over interest expense, thus adjusting cash/liquidity for the firm’s ability to pay 
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their interest obligations, are all significant, The measure of CMA using long term debt over total 
assets, which thus focuses on long term and on average more stable financing, are also significant 
at the usual levels and support our hypotheses.  
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we research the effects of cash holdings and financial leverage in different 
periods (boom and crisis). Based on prior literature and observing the effects in actual stock 
markets, we believe they have different patterns in terms of their effect on firm performance during 
these two types of periods. Considering the analysis above, we confirm the following conclusions. 
Both cash holdings and financial leverage have opposite effects on firm performance during 
economic expansion periods and recession periods. Rich cash holdings are positively associated 
with firms’ stock performance during crisis periods, which is in line with hypothesis 1, but, in 
contrast, damages stock performance during boom periods, which supports hypothesis 2. 
Examining the results more closely, a high level of financial leverage can positively influence 
stock performance during economic expansion periods, consistent with hypothesis 3, but will 
decrease firms’ stock performance during economic recession periods, which supports hypothesis 
4. However, to offset the survival bias problem in the crisis period, we form our sample using 
firms with investment grade S&P Long-term Domestic Debt ratings. This creates potential 
problems, including rating migration and the special nature of certain crises, which may bias our 
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Average monthly excess returns for annually rebalanced portfolios formed on Size and Cash 
holdings. Panel R1 and R2 refer to economic recession periods. Panel E1 and E2 refer to economic 
expansion periods. 
 
Panel R1: 07/1990-03/1991 
 Poor 2 3 4 Rich 
Small -6.2% -4.8% -4.6% -3.0% -4.6% 
2 -4.1% -4.1% -4.3% -2.5% -3.8% 
3 -4.2% -3.3% -3.7% -2.2% -2.6% 
4 -2.5% -2.2% -2.8% -2.5% -0.4% 
Big 0.0% -0.6% -0.1% 0.0% 1.2% 
Panel R2: 12/2007-06/2009 
 Poor 2 3 4 Rich 
Small -5.9% -6.0% -5.4% -6.3% -6.6% 
2 -5.4% -4.6% -4.4% -5.9% -5.8% 
3 -4.0% -4.3% -4.1% -4.7% -4.6% 
4 -4.6% -4.3% -4.4% -3.9% -3.5% 
Big -3.2% -3.3% -3.2% -3.2% -3.3% 
Panel E1: 10/2006-06/2007 
 Poor 2 3 4 Rich 
Small 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 1.1% -0.3% 
2 0.8% -0.2% 0.6% 0.0% -0.7% 
3 0.9% 0.5% 0.8% 1.1% -0.1% 
4 0.4% 0.8% 1.1% 1.1% 0.2% 
Big 1.3% 1.0% 0.9% 0.5% 1.2% 
Panel E2: 09/2014-03/2016  
 Poor 2 3 4 Rich 
Small -1.8% -1.3% -3.1% -2.7% -4.9% 
2 -1.0% -0.7% -1.3% -1.8% -3.7% 
3 -1.2% -1.2% -1.0% -1.4% -2.3% 
4 -1.3% -1.0% -0.8% -0.4% -1.2% 




Average monthly excess returns for quarterly rebalanced portfolios formed on Size and Cash 
holdings. Panel R1 and R2 refer to economic recession periods. Panel E1 and E2 refer to economic 
expansion periods. 
 
Panel R1: 07/1990-03/1991 
 Poor 2 3 4 Rich 
Small -2.9% -2.0% -2.9% -0.2% -1.2% 
2 -3.7% -3.3% -4.0% -2.9% -2.5% 
3 -3.5% -2.9% -2.1% -1.3% -0.2% 
4 -2.4% -2.2% -1.9% -2.6% 0.1% 
Big 0.1% -0.5% -0.1% 0.0% 1.0% 
Panel R2: 12/2007-06/2009 
 Poor 2 3 4 Rich 
Small -4.2% -4.0% -5.6% -3.9% -6.2% 
2 -4.6% -4.9% -4.8% -5.8% -5.7% 
3 -4.4% -4.2% -4.5% -4.7% -4.4% 
4 -4.2% -3.9% -4.5% -3.8% -4.3% 
Big -2.9% -3.4% -3.7% -3.3% -3.8% 
Panel E1: 10/2006-06/2007 
 Poor 2 3 4 Rich 
Small -0.2% -0.1% 0.3% 0.9% 1.6% 
2 0.6% 0.3% 0.3% -0.7% 0.1% 
3 0.6% 0.1% 0.9% 1.6% 0.2% 
4 0.8% 0.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.0% 
Big 1.2% 0.7% 1.0% 0.7% 1.5% 
Panel E2: 09/2014-03/2016    
 Poor 2 3 4 Rich 
Small -1.7% -1.9% -2.7% -3.1% -4.8% 
2 -1.7% -2.6% -1.4% -2.9% -2.7% 
3 -1.6% -1.5% -1.7% -2.2% -2.9% 
4 -1.7% -1.1% -1.7% -0.9% -2.2% 




Value weighted average monthly return comparison for stocks with poor and rich cash holdings. 
N refers to the number of observation. Mean indicates the value weighted average continuous return. R1 and R2 represent economic 
recession periods. E1 and E2 represent economic expansion periods. 
T-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All the 










  N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Average monthly return for stocks with 
poor cash holding (annually rebalanced) 
(1) 
9327 0.0% 17651 -3.3%*** 8781 1.2%*** 14552 -0.4%*** 
 (-0.32)  (-33.45)  (21.81)  (-6.56) 
Average monthly return for stocks with 
rich cash holding (annually rebalanced) 
(2) 
5800 0.9%*** 10848 -3.4%*** 5174 1.0%*** 8979 0.2%* 
 (4.82)  (-21.77)  (8.91)  (1.67) 
Difference in average monthly return 
poor cash – rich cash (1) - (2) 
(3) 
 -1.0%***  0.2%  0.2%*  -0.2% 
 (-3.66)  (0.68)  (1.72)  (-1.61) 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Average monthly return for stocks with 
poor cash holding (quarterly rebalanced) 
(4) 
8271 0.0% 15730 -3.0%*** 8690 1.1%*** 14009 -0.7%*** 
 (0.40)  (-29.84)  (19.54)  (-11.60) 
Average monthly return for stocks with 
rich cash holding (quarterly rebalanced) 
(5) 
5496 0.9%*** 9690 -3.9%*** 4950 1.3%*** 8492 -0.4%*** 
 (4.54)  (-23.74)  (9.23)  (-3.66) 
Difference in average monthly return 




















Average monthly excess returns for annually rebalanced portfolios formed on Size and Financial 
Leverage. Panel R1 and R2 refer to economic recession periods. Panel E1 and E2 refer to 
economic expansion periods. 
 
Panel R1: 07/1990-03/1991    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small -2.1% -2.3% -0.6% -4.6% 0.2% 
2 -2.1% -0.8% -0.9% -2.3% 0.1% 
3 -0.2% -5.3% -4.3% -2.5% -0.6% 
4 -1.0% -0.4% 0.0% 0.0% -0.3% 
Big 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.5% -0.6% 
Panel R2: 12/2007-06/2009    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small -5.0% -5.0% -12.9% -7.4% -3.5% 
2 -2.4% -3.9% -4.1% -5.0% -2.2% 
3 -2.8% -3.5% -5.0% -3.4% -2.9% 
4 -6.2% -2.7% -4.2% -3.6% -4.1% 
Big -2.8% -2.5% -3.4% -2.4% -4.0% 
Panel E1: 10/2006-06/2007    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% -2.0% 0.4% 
2 1.6% 1.4% 0.9% -0.7% 0.0% 
3 1.2% 1.1% 1.3% 1.8% 1.4% 
4 1.7% 1.2% 1.6% 2.6% 0.4% 
Big 1.8% 0.8% 0.5% 1.2% 0.8% 
Panel E2: 09/2014-03/2016    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small 0.5% -0.7% -0.9% 1.8% 1.4% 
2 -0.3% 0.0% -0.5% 0.0% 0.3% 
3 -0.4% -0.1% -0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 
4 0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.6% 0.3% 




Average monthly excess returns for quarterly rebalanced portfolios formed on Size and Financial 
Leverage. Panel R1 and R2 refer to economic recession periods. Panel E1 and E2 refer to 
economic expansion periods. 
 
Panel R1: 07/1990-03/1991    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small 1.0% 2.5% -6.0% -1.4% -0.3% 
2 -2.6% -2.6% -0.1% -0.9% 0.4% 
3 -7.9% -2.2% -4.8% -2.1% -2.0% 
4 -2.8% 2.0% 1.7% 0.7% 0.5% 
Big -0.1% 1.8% 0.6% 0.2% -0.7% 
Panel R2: 12/2007-06/2009    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small -3.1% -1.1% -2.1% -2.4% -2.6% 
2 -3.7% -1.8% -6.5% -3.0% -1.4% 
3 -1.1% -4.4% -3.8% -3.3% -2.4% 
4 -2.9% -2.4% -3.0% -3.1% -3.7% 
Big -2.8% -3.5% -3.8% -2.6% -3.4% 
Panel E1: 10/2006-06/2007    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small 0.8% 1.8% 1.2% 1.1% 1.6% 
2 0.9% 0.6% 0.8% 0.4% 1.8% 
3 1.6% 0.2% 1.6% 0.9% 0.9% 
4 0.6% 1.0% 2.3% 1.9% 0.6% 
Big 1.6% 0.5% 1.1% 1.2% 0.5% 
Panel E2: 09/2014-03/2016    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small 0.3% 1.0% 1.1% -0.1% -0.2% 
2 -0.1% -0.7% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 
3 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.5% 0.2% 
4 0.6% -0.3% 0.0% -0.3% -0.1% 
Big -1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 
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Table 4  
Value weighted average monthly return comparison for stocks with aggressive and conservative financial leverage. 
N refers to the number of observation. Mean indicates the value weighted average continuous return. R1 and R2 represent economic 
recession periods. E1 and E2 represent economic expansion periods. 
T-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All the 










  N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Average monthly return for stocks with 
aggressive financial leverage (annual 
rebalance) 
(1) 
2225 -0.6%*** 3396 -3.9%*** 1818 0.8%*** 2956 0.2%* 
 (-3.09)  (-14.44)  (7.17)  (1.87) 
Average monthly return for stocks with 
conservative financial leverage (annual 
rebalance) 
(2) 
427 0.1% 1018 -3.0%*** 449 1.7%*** 1074 -0.1% 
 (0.22)  (-8.33)  (7.97)  (-0.36) 
Difference in average monthly return 
aggressive leverage – conservative 
leverage (1) - (2) 
(3) 
 -0.7%  -1.0%**  -0.9%***  0.3% 
 (-1.47)  (-2.11)  (-3.63)  (1.18) 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Average monthly return for stocks with 
aggressive financial leverage (quarterly 
rebalanced) 
(4) 








Average monthly return for stocks with 
conservative financial leverage 
(quarterly rebalanced) 
(5) 








Difference in average monthly return 
aggressive leverage – conservative 




















Table 5  
Using four factors in regressions to explain the effect of Cash Holdings to Stock 
Return. R1 and R2 refer to the economic recession periods. E1 and E2 refer to the 
economic expansion periods. VIF values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
RM-Rf SMB HML RMP 
R1 (07/1990-03/1991) 0.89*** 0.10*** 0.16*** 0.04*** 
(R2 = 0.17)     VIF (2.27) (1.83) (1.45) (1.86) 
R2 (12/2007-06/2009) 1.04*** 0.17*** 0.02*** 0.08*** 
(R2 = 0.40)     VIF (1.77) (2.37) (3.30) (1.82) 
E1 (10/2006-06/2007) 1.00*** 0.17*** -0.05*** -0.08*** 
(R2 = 0.21)     VIF (1.07) (1.13) (1.08) (1.02) 
E2 (09/2014-03/2016) 1.00*** 0.19*** 0.20*** -0.01** 




Using four factors in regressions to explain the effect of Financial Leverage to Stock 
Return. R1 and R2 refer to the economic recession periods. E1 and E2 refer to the 
economic expansion periods. VIF values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
RM-Rf SMB HML CMA 
R1 (07/1990-03/1991) 0.88*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.06*** 
(R2 = 0.17)     VIF (2.44) (1.82) (1.37) (1.96) 
R2 (12/2007-06/2009) 1.05*** 0.16*** 0.04*** 0.01 
(R2 = 0.40)     VIF (1.58) (2.28) (2.89) (1.24) 
E1 (10/2006-06/2007) 1.00*** 0.18*** -0.04*** -0.10*** 
(R2 = 0.21)     VIF (1.06) (1.14) (1.08) (1.03) 
E2 (09/2014-03/2016) 1.00*** 0.20*** 0.22*** -0.13*** 




Using five factors in regressions to explain the effect of Cash Holdings and Financial Leverage to 
Stock Return. R1 and R2 refer to the economic recession periods. E1 and E2 refer to the economic 
expansion periods. VIF values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 RM-Rf SMB HML RMP CMA 
R1 (07/1990-03/1991) 0.87*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.03** 0.06*** 
(R2 = 0.17)     VIF (2.75) (1.83) (1.66) (1.92) (2.02) 
R2 (12/2007-06/2009) 1.03*** 0.17*** 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.00 
(R2 = 0.40)     VIF (1.81) (2.37) (3.32) (1.87) (1.28) 
E1 (10/2006-06/2007) 1.00*** 0.18*** -0.04** -0.06*** -0.08*** 
(R2 = 0.21)     VIF (1.09) (1.15) (1.08) (1.08) (1.09) 
E2 (09/2014-03/2016) 1.00*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.03*** -0.14*** 




Regression for summarized periods: 07/1990-
03/1991, 12/2007-06/2009, 10/2006-06/2007 
and 09/2014-03/2016, 56 months. 
RMPC and CMAC are two interact dummy 
variables, which equal to RMP and CMA 
respectively for the economic recession 
periods and equal to 0 for the economic 
expansion periods. 
Intercept  0.00*** 
  (13.29) 
   
Rm-Rf 
 
1.01***   
(449.42)    
SMB 
 
0.16***   
(51.54)    
HML 
 
0.06***   
(19.36)    
RMP 
 
-0.06***   
(-6.60)    
CMA 
 
-0.07***   
(-8.25)    
RMPC 
 
0.12***   
(11.40)    
CMAC 
 
0.06***   
(6.48) 
T-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 





Using four factors in regressions to explain the effect of Cash Holdings to Stock 
Return. R1 and R2 refer to the economic recession periods. E1 and E2 refer to the 
economic expansion periods. Cash factor is measured by Cash and Short-Term 
Investments (CHE) over Total Interest and Related Expense (XINT). 
VIF values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
RM-Rf SMB HML RMP 
R1 (07/1990-03/1991) 0.90*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 
(R2 = 0.17)     VIF (2.34) (2.07) (1.52) (1.33) 
R2 (12/2007-06/2009) 1.10*** 0.23*** 0.03*** 0.11*** 
(R2 = 0.40)     VIF (1.39) (2.66) (3.06) (1.24) 
E1 (10/2006-06/2007) 1.00*** 0.19*** -0.04*** -0.07*** 
(R2 = 0.22)     VIF (1.05) (1.22) (1.17) (1.01) 
E2 (09/2014-03/2016) 1.00*** 0.20*** 0.22*** -0.08*** 




Using four factors in regressions to explain the effect of Financial Leverage to Stock 
Return. R1 and R2 refer to the economic recession periods. E1 and E2 refer to the 
economic expansion periods. Financial leverage is measured by Long-Term Debt 
Total (DLTT) over Total Assets (AT). 
VIF values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
RM-Rf SMB HML CMA 
R1 (07/1990-03/1991) 0.91*** 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 
(R2 = 0.17)     VIF (2.49) (2.08) (1.61) (1.44) 
R2 (12/2007-06/2009) 1.10*** 0.22*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
(R2 = 0.40)     VIF (1.52) (2.68) (2.98) (1.31) 
E1 (10/2006-06/2007) 1.00*** 0.19*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 
(R2 = 0.22)     VIF (1.08) (1.24) (1.18) (1.10) 
E2 (09/2014-03/2016) 1.00*** 0.21*** 0.24*** -0.18*** 




Using five factors in regressions to explain the effect of Cash Holdings and Financial Leverage to 
Stock Return. R1 and R2 refer to the economic recession periods. E1 and E2 refer to the economic 
expansion periods. Cash factor is measured by Cash and Short-Term Investments (CHE) over Total 
Interest and Related Expense (XINT). Financial leverage is measured by Long-Term Debt Total 
(DLTT) over Total Assets (AT). 
VIF values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 RM-Rf SMB HML RMP CMA 
R1 (07/1990-03/1991) 0.90*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.01 
(R2 = 0.17)     VIF (2.57) (2.09) (1.64) (1.66) (1.80) 
R2 (12/2007-06/2009) 1.10*** 0.23*** 0.03*** 0.10*** 0.01 
(R2 = 0.40)     VIF (1.53) (2.68) (3.07) (1.56) (1.64) 
E1 (10/2006-06/2007) 1.00*** 0.18*** -0.04** -0.07*** 0.01 
(R2 = 0.22)     VIF (1.08) (1.30) (1.18) (1.44) (1.57) 
E2 (09/2014-03/2016) 1.00*** 0.20*** 0.23*** -0.03*** -0.16*** 




Regression for summarized periods: 07/1990-
03/1991, 12/2007-06/2009, 10/2006-06/2007 
and 09/2014-03/2016, 56 months. 
Cash factor is measured by Cash and Short-
Term Investments (CHE) over Total Interest 
and Related Expense (XINT). Financial 
leverage is measured by Long-Term Debt 
Total (DLTT) over Total Assets (AT). 
RMPC and CMAC are two interact dummy 
variables, which equal to RMP and CMA 
respectively for the economic recession 
periods and equal to 0 for the economic 
expansion periods. 
Intercept  0.00*** 
  (14.33) 
   
Rm-Rf 
 
1.06***   
(478.61)    
SMB 
 
0.21***   
(62.68)    
HML 
 
0.09***   
(22.82)    
RMP 
 
-0.10***   
(-9.90)    
CMA 
 
-0.11***   
(-7.74)    
RMPC 
 
0.18***   
(16.68)    
CMAC 
 
0.13***   
(8.47) 
T-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 





Median S&P domestic long-term debt rating for annually rebalanced portfolios formed on Size 
and Financial Leverage. Panel R1 and R2 refer to economic recession periods. Panel E1 and E2 
refer to economic expansion periods. 
Panel R1: 07/1990-03/1991    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small A-/BBB+ BBB AA-/BBB+ A A- 
2 A- AA-/A A-/BBB+ A- BBB+ 
3 AA+/AA- BBB+ A A- BBB+ 
4 A A/A- A-/BBB+ A- BBB+ 
Big AA A+ A+ A+ A 
Panel R2: 12/2007-06/2009    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ 
2 BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB 
3 A- BBB+ BBB BBB BBB 
4 BBB+ A- A- A- BBB 
Big A A A- A- A- 
Panel E1: 10/2006-06/2007    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+/BBB BBB+ 
2 BBB BBB BBB BBB+/BBB BBB 
3 BBB+ A- BBB+ BBB BBB 
4 BBB+ A-/BBB+ A- A- BBB 
Big A A A A- A- 
Panel E2: 09/2014-03/2016    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small BBB+ BBB BBB BBB+ BBB 
2 BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB 
3 BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB 
4 A A A- A- BBB+ 




Median S&P domestic long-term debt rating for quarterly rebalanced portfolios formed on Size 
and Financial Leverage. Panel R1 and R2 refer to economic recession periods. Panel E1 and E2 
refer to economic expansion periods. 
Panel R1: 07/1990-03/1991    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small BBB BBB+ BBB A-/BBB+ BBB+ 
2 A- A- A- BBB A- 
3 BBB A-/BBB+ A- BBB+ BBB+ 
4 A A- A-/BBB+ A- BBB+ 
Big AA- A+ A+ A+ A 
Panel R2: 12/2007-06/2009    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small BBB+ BBB BBB BBB+/BBB BBB+ 
2 BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB 
3 BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB 
4 A- BBB+ A-/BBB+ A- BBB+ 
Big A A- A- A- A- 
Panel E1: 10/2006-06/2007    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small A BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ 
2 BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB 
3 A-/BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB+ BBB 
4 A BBB+ BBB+ A- BBB+ 
Big A A A- A- A 
Panel E2: 09/2014-03/2016    
 Conservative 2 3 4 Aggressive 
Small A BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ 
2 BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB 
3 A-/BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB+ BBB 
4 A BBB+ BBB+ A- BBB+ 
Big A A A- A- A 
 
 
